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This paper was prepared at the request of the Swedish International Development
Authority (SDI ) in collaboration with the land markets project of the Ford Foundation and
the Land Tenure Center. The terms of reference for the inquiry were as follows:
A necessary condition for moving toward sustainable development in Nicaragua is the
achievement of a satisfactory level of security of tenure. The objective of this study is to
identify the priority components for a program to legalize existing rights to land which are
not being adequately covered by existing programs. The study will make an inventory and a
review of already existing donor-supported projects for improving tenure security as well as
projects being seriously contemplated or in the pipeline and projects being conducted by
government and NGOS with their own resources.
The existing and planned programs of legalization will be examined using the following
criteria:
degree of coordination among agencies involved in legalization of tenure, modernization
of the registry system, and monitoring of related programs;
• type and adequacy of graphic description of parcel boundaries (cadastral mapping);
o methodologies for documentation of existing rights to land;
> mechanisms, norms, and procedure for resolution of conflicts and compensation of
legitimate claims which have been modified or extinguished;
• models for titling of rights, which are flexible enoughto encompass a variety of situations
and variable number of rights;
• steps taken for modernization of the registry system to absorb and continually update the
new titles; and
• adequacy of legal, policy, and administrative structure for the legalization program and
for the modernization of the registration system.
Before initiating the study and to complete the investigation within the allotted time, it
was agreed that tenure issues in the Atlantic region would not be addressed in the report. Yet,
the questions of indigenous peoples' claims to land and the problems of colonists' incursions
in that area are serious and merit separate consideration .
Initial fieldwork for this study was conducted during the month of October 1992 in
collaboration with Freddy Ardor and Orlando Cortez, School of Agricultural Economics,
National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (University National Autónoma de
Nicaragua, UNMAN) in Managua. Special thanks are given to these two individuals for sharing
their insights. Follow-up work was done in September 1994 in collaboration with Rosa
Amelia Rodriguez. Appreciation is extended as well to Jaime Coffre, National Institute for
Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nicaraguense de la Reforma Agraria, INRA), who explained the
government's strategy for dealing with tenure insecurity in agriculture; to Mireya Molina,
who provided a careful analysis of the agrarian sector's legal situation; and to Ricardo
ixGuevara, who provided analysis of the indemization bonds, building on the work by John
Strasma and Javier Molina in 1994.
The list of people contacted for the study is presented in annexes 4 and 5. Each person
provided thoughtful suggestions and was generous of his/her time. Errors of fact and
interpretation, however, remain the sole responsibility of the author. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and not those of the Land Tenure Center orASDI .




The objective of this paper is to describe priority actions for reducing the legal insecurity of
tenure to land in Nicaragua. To achieve this end, the study explores (1) the meaning and
origins of tenure insecurity as well as the implications of tenure insecurity for the
development of the country; (2) the extent of different types of tenure insecurity; (3) the
options presently being explored for dealing with the problem in Nicaragua; and (4)
recommendations for action.
1. MEANING, ORIGINS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF LEGAL INSECURITY
The concept of land tenure relates to the rules whereby a society defines the access people
have to the land and the uses to which people put the land, including the economic benefits
generated therefrom. Tenure, then, includes such terms as property title, life-estate title,
leasehold, usufruct, and the like. There are myriad ways of defining entitlements to and uses
of the land, and all are social creations, that is, agreements among people about what rights
are held, by whom, and for what length of time. To provide structure to such agreements,
laws are passed in most societies about what sort of tenure arrangements are supported by the
power of the state.
Tenure insecurity under such conditions is a combination of objective and subjective
situations. Objectively, tenure insecurity can be exacerbated by the absence of a legal
document defining a particular right or the existence of multiple documents describing the
same rights for different people or entities over the same piece of land. Subjectively,
insecurity can occur in situations of a rising probability of losing rights to land, which occur
when society s rules of tenure change or when the power of one group to defend its rights
wanes while that of a competing group increases.
The complex histories of property legislation in most countries testify to the different
manifestations of tenure insecurity and to the futility of eliminating its occurrence. However,
when excessive tenure insecurity affects large segments of the population, people tend to
devote their energies to protecting their claims to land and do not make the necessary
investments of capital and labor for improving productivity and meeting the needs of society.
In this sense, providing an adequate security of tenure is a precondition for the functioning2
of a modem economy, though it is certainly not sufficient for achieving economic, social, and
environmental progress.
People derive rights to land in a number of ways, each of which has a risk of increasing
their insecurity of tenure:
► Negotiated transfer: In private property systems—such as in Nicaragua in "normal "
times—people either purchase rights from the legitimate holders of those privileges
or trade for them. The law encourages the recording of changes of ownership or other
long-term entitlement to land in the property registry. Any right that is not recorded
will ordinarily be superseded in a court of law by a right that is registered.
► Force: Rights also derive from the use of force—the conquering of one people by
another, the obligation imposed on a weaker person by a stronger one, or the use of
the state's police power to acquire private property. Again, even in cases of forced
transfer, the private property system encourages the recording of new rights in the
process of superseding those that were taken, or else a court at some subsequent time
can reverse the forced acquisition.
► Social allocation: Finally, the social entity can recognize the rights that derive from
the extinction of the public's entitlement to land in favor of a private individual. The
titling of public land to private individuals through programs of colonization or
agrarian reform is an example of such an allocation. It is usually the responsibility
of the acquirer of such rights to record the entitlement in the relevant property
registry, or a second allocation may be made of the same land—and the one that is
recorded first will usually be held as legitimate in a court of law.
In Nicaragua, insecurity of tenure has increased for each type of transaction of rights over
land due primarily to the same claim being made by different people for the same piece of
land.
1.1 INSECURITY OF NEGOTIATED TRANSFERS
The negotiated transfers in Nicaragua may fail to provide secure rights to the "buyer" if
the probability of undetected fraud by the "seller" is relatively high. This happens when the
property registries do not contain accurate and accessible information on the registered
holders of rights to the land. The property registry in Matagalpa, for example, was burned
in 1979, and efforts to reconstruct the information which it contained have been only partially
successful since some persons did not re-record their rights. In other property registries, the
documentation of rights is in bad condition physically, some information is missing, and
cadastral records have not been updated for several years. In yet other registries, there are
no cadastral maps, which makes the location of properties and their boundaries difficult.




The problem of perceived illegitimacy of forced transfers can last a long time. In the case
of the Sutiava of León, the annexation of land in 1902 is still not recognized as legitimateby
the indigenous community. Land invasions to recover these rights contribute to the tenure
insecurity of the present holders of rights to these lands.
The Somozas' often not-too-subtle "negotiations" for land resulted in the displacement of
many families in the Pacific region from the 1930s through the 1960s. The degree of coercion
in these transfers might be debated, depending on one's point of view, but there was enough .
resentment to provide much of the energies for the overthrow of the Somoza government in
1979 and the removal of the Somoza family and others from lands which they claimed having
acquired legitimately.
The expropriations and confiscations of land throughout Nicaragua in the 1980s are still
the subject of acrimonious debates and violence. The state's acquisition of properties
following the revolution of 1979 proceeded in stages, summarized in table 1.1. The first stage
was confiscation of approximately 2,000 properties (occupying about 1,400,000 manzanas)
of the Somoza family and allegados (people closely linked to the Somozas) through the
application of Decrees 3, 38, and 329, issued by the new junta in July and August of 1979,
prior to the creation of a separate legislative body. In July 1981, Decree no. 760 approved
the state's acquisition of properties abandoned by their owners, which resulted in the
procurement of 252 properties occupying 18,230 manzanas. Also in July 1981, the ruling
junta approved Decree no. 782, the Agrarian Reform Law (which was modified by Law 14
in January 1986), authorizing the expropriation of abandoned or poorly managed properties.
Under this law the state acquired an estimated 1,200 properties, totaling about 820,000
manzanas. During the 1980s the state also purchased 1,050 properties occupying 196,000
manzanas (including properties which had been mortgaged to the state development bank but
the debt had not been paid) and obtained another 860 properties occupying approximately
89,000 manzanas through other mechanisms.
The acquisition of at least 5,362 agricultural properties (2,523,181 manzanas) by the
previous government as well as the de facto permanent occupation of lands which were to be
temporarily held (estimated to be about 300,000 manzanas) have been the subject of much
conflict since the time of their appropriation.
The outward expression of latent conflict dramatically increased following the issuance
of Decree 11-90 by the UNO government immediately upon its entering office. The new law
established a review commission, whose mandate was to reassess all acquisition of property
from private owners by the previous government and to return properties determined to have
been either unjustly acquired by the state or illegally occupied by third parties. Present
occupants and owners of these lands are concerned about the loss of their rights while
previous owners are worried that their prior rights will not be respected.4
TABLE 1.1 Acquisition of land for the agrarian reform 
MEANS OF ACQUISITION No. OF PROPERTIES AREA (mz)
Decrees 3, 38, and 329 2,000 1,400,000
Agrarian Reform Law (1981) 1,200 820,000
Abandonment law 252 18,230
Purchases by Sandinista government 1,050 196,000
Purchases by present government 96 250,000 
De facto occupations during Sandinista government 510 300,000 
Other means 860 88,951
TOTAL 5,968 3,073,181
I
a. Source for data on the Sandinista government is Mireya Molina Torres, " Legislacón
agraria y su vigencia actual," mimeo. (Managua, October 1994). Data do not include land
acquired but returned to previous owners and therefore not available to campesinos.
b. Estimates of purchases and de facto occupations come from various functionaries and
require more time and effort to verify. The other data in the table are also estimates, though
are more substantiated since many of the acquisitions of land have not been adequately
documented and since the files of INRA (Instituto Nicaragüense de Reforma Agraria,
responsible for applying the Agrarian Reform Law and other laws and decrees dealing with
rural properties) are being reorganized, having proved difficult to tabulate in their present
state. Moreover, different estimates exist for the same parameter, such as the figure provided
by the Ministerio de Finanzas, which estimates there to be 817,000 manzanas of land
confiscated under Decrees 3 and 38, versus the total of 2,232,220 manzanas "confiscadas"
mentioned by the Nuevo Diario (20 October 1992, p. 8). As one researcher advised me, "If
the data on the agrarian reform from any source are internally consistent, be suspicious."
The legal status of many of the properties acquired in one way on another by the state is
complicated by the fact that about 70 percent of the properties procured from private owners
by the previous government (about 3,750 properties) were never legalized as holdings of the
state. The properties were occupied by the state or beneficiaries of the agrarian reform
without the state s completing the chain of actions that existing law establishes for legally
obtaining ownership. This acquisition of rights of ownership should be finalized through the
entry of the state as owner in the appropriate property registries, thus extinguishing and
physically crossing out the previous owners  rights.
Yet, some of the former owners of many of the 1,600 properties that had been legally
acquired by the state and properly recorded in the registries are now claiming that the state s
acquisition of rights to their land had happened under duress, that they had not received
adequate compensation, or that they were forced to agree to the transfer of ownership. With
control of the state s administrative apparatus passing to a government that is more responsive
to the interests of previous owners, these people now feel empowered to reverse the earlier
transfers or at least to appeal for a review of their cases.5
This questioning of the legitimacy of past governmental acquisitions and allocations of
land through review and possible reversal leaves present occupants of land in substantial
doubt about the security of their claims. Past claimants of land likewise have little assurance
that they will recover the land or, if they do so forcibly, what the consequences will be over
the coming years.
Under such conditions, violence has become a serious problem in both rural and urban
areas. Present occupants of land react angrily to the threat of eviction while claimants attempt
forcibly to reoccupy the land, producing a conflictive situation which can only prejudice the
long-term investment process required for progress in the country.
1.3 INSECURITY ASSOCIATED WITH ASSIGNMENT OF LAND BY THE STATE TO
"BENEFICIARIES
" OF LAND PROGRAMS
The allocation of rights to land through the agrarian reform has, in addition, contributed
to the prevalence of insecurity in land tenure. Titling of land occurred in five ways during
the previous government:
(1) titling of parcels of land to groups of people, who were expected to form group
farming enterprises or cooperatives that would manage the farms collectively (the
Cooperativas Agrícolas Sandinistas, or CAS);
(2) titling of parcels of land to smaller groups called work collectives (Colectivos de
Trabajo, or CT, which were also known as family collectives since their members
were often from the same family), with undefined rules for collective or individual
management of the assigned lands;
(3) titling of parcels of land to groups that were permitted to farm individually, though
physical boundaries between parcels were not allowed (only a dead furrow was
permitted, or a small ditch produced by plowing the land in both directions, thereby
giving the name Cooperativas de Surco Muerto, or CSM); in some cases titles were
issued to groups of farmers organized into Cooperativas de Crédito y Servicio
(Cooperatives of Credit and Service, or Ccs), with the understanding that the parcels
so assigned would be farmed individually by members of the group;
(4) titling to individuals, which occurred more frequently in the late 1980s and was of
two subtypes with differing importance in different regions: (a) titling to individuals,
which involved the termination of previous rights, and (b) titling in special regions,
which basically concerned land that people already possessed but had not legally
recorded; and
(5) issuing of collective titles to indigenous communities in the Atlantic regions.
Most of the titles, other than those for the precaristas and indigenous communities, were
issued as "provisional" since the state did not have legal possession of the land. Such
provisional titles could not be recorded in the property registries until the state's ownership
had been verified. This difficulty was overcome in 1990 with National Assembly of Law 88,
which transformed provisional titles into full property titles capable of being recorded in the
registries regardless of whether the affected holdings had been previously inscribed as
property of the state.6
However, most of the provisional titles so transformed still cannot be recorded in the
registries without further documentation, since the boundaries and areas of the properties
were not described with sufficient precision. Even the definitive titles issued by the previous
government did not contain accurate descriptions of parcel boundaries or accurate estimates
of parcel areas, both requisites for recording such titles in the property registries. An
additional complication with the provisional titles often is the recording of agrarian reform
titles in special books within the property registries, not in the "real rights" section used for
private property. This anomaly still occurs, even after the January 1990 passage of Law 88,
which instructed registrars to accord agrarian reform titles full property rights.
As if these complications were not enough, the facilities offered by Law 88 for legalizing
provisional titles ended with the derogation of the law under somewhat confused circum-
stances (see Molina 1992). Since Law 88 was passed as a special category of legislation
(orden público), the rights and benefits granted by the law are unalterable (irrenunciables )
except through legislation that expressly modifies those rights. Thus, the probable derogation
of Law 88 (by Law 133 and by suggestion in the presidential veto of Law 133, which was
upheld by the Assembly) does not affect rights bestowed by the law prior to its probable
derogation in July 1992 (we use the term "probable derogation" because the Supreme Court
has not as yet judged the issue, and there is basis for doubting the impacts of the exemption
and subsequent veto). It seems safe to assume that Law 88 is no longer in effect, but that
rights bestowed by that law prior to 31 July 1992 are legally defensible.
Under such an assumption, it is important to note that any property titles issued by INRA
(Instituto Nicaragüense de la Reforma Agraria) after 31 July 1992 will be governed by
Agrarian Reform Law no. 14 of 1986, which is still in effect, and not by Law 88. In
particular, while Law 88 bestowed full property rights, that is, the right to sell, give,
transfer, inherit, and effect any other type ofalienation of the property, the Agrarian Reform
Law states that titled property rights can be transferred or subdivisions of properties carried
out only with the expressed authorization of INRA. Without INRA s ratification of these
operations, no property registrar should record them.
Another complication with registering agrarian reform property is that many of the titles
granted were allocated to groups of people (group farms, known in Nicaragua as cooperatives
or work collectives). The names of the individual members of these groups at the time were
placed on the provisional titles, which provided the approximate area of land assigned to each
group and the names of adjoining properties or owners. However, with the passage of time
and the turnover of group members, many of the present members of these groups differ from
those named on the provisional titles. Yet, before the land can be definitively titled, the group
must be recertified by the Ministry of Labor and a legal entity with personería jurídica
established.
The previous government's allocation of rights to land following its loss in the elections
of 1990 (the period of the piñata) has produced yet another series of conflicts over land. This
set of disputes arose largely due to the lack of formal titling of land by the government before
the elections. It seems likely that most apportionments in the transition period were merely7
formalizations of past, de facto allocations of rights. On the other hand, there were
allocations made after the elections—but before the assumption of power by the new
government—that awarded land to people who were not eligible as agrarian reform
beneficiaries or as beneficiaries of urban property-distribution programs. These latter cases,
viewed as illegitimate by most political groups in Nicaragua, are being identified and
reviewed and will receive some adjustment, including eviction of land recipients. Estimates
of illegitimate allocations of agricultural land involve about 650 titles of more than 50
manzanas per person, totaling approximately 110,000 manzanas (estimated by assuming 527
"suspicious" titles averaging 82 manzanas of land, 91 such titles averaging 293 manzanas of
land, and 32 such titles averaging 1,217 manzanas of land).
Table 1.2 shows the extent of land titling during the transition period (March-April
1990), titling before February 1990, and titling by the present government.
Three new complications to the tenure situation were introduced following the election
of the UNO government:
(1) The peace accords and agreements with the Nicaraguan resistance and the Nicaraguan
army committed the government to assigning land to their ex-combatants. In the
opinion of the ex-combatants, this assignment did not occur with sufficient speed or
involve enough land, leading to invasions of both agrarian reform and privately
owned land by refugees and members of the ex-resistance as well as by other landless
groups and ex-army members.
(2) In 1990, agrarian commissions were established at the departmental and municipal
levels to negotiate among the various groups in conflict over agricultural land. The
commissions issued decisions about the insertion of the ex-combatants (usually) onto
lands already claimed by others (the government's own state farms, cooperatives, and
other private lands). These commissions were successful in reducing the number of
conflicts among people claiming rights to the same land, but questions about the
legitimacy (legality) of the commissions' decisions have created another layer of
controversy over rights to land.
(3) The National Review Commission, created to detect and correct illegitimate
usurpation of land from prior owners, received approximately 6,000 requests from
previous owners for the return of land (approximately 4,000 of which concerned
agricultural land). The commission issued about 2,200 decisions for the return of
land, in most cases without determining the nature or basis of the existing occupation.
These decisions usually permitted the claimant to request the state courts, police, and
army to enforce the eviction of present occupants. The conflicts that arose as
occupants defended what they saw as their legitimate rights led to a paralysis of the
process. This cessation was solidified by the Supreme Court's decision that impor-
tant parts of the decree authorizing the National Review Commission were unconsti-
tutional.8
TABLE 1.2 Titling of agricultural land by the state, July 1981-August 1994
FORM / PERIOD NO. OF TITLES AREA (mz) FAMILIES (mz;
Group farms (CAS, Ccs , CT, CSM)
07/81-12/89   740  144,343 10,769 (est)
03/90-04/90   1,999
2 480,733  26,308 (est)
09/92-08/94
6 110 37,921 1,545
Subtotal 2,849 661,997  38,622
"
Individuals
07/81-12/89    13,400  255,000 13,400




5 510,983  17,711
09/92-08/94  6,217
6 152,596 6,217
Subtotal 45,711 1,329,877 45,711
Total 48,560 1,992,874 84,333
State-acquired land in state enterprises (APP) 755,000
9
Other titling of land already in possession of
recipients of titles 
Indigenous communities (1981-04/1990) n.d. 170,000 600
Special zones (precaristas) 52,900 1,459,996 52,900
1. Estimate of the number of cooperatives that had a title of some sort prior to February 1990, were not
retitled in the interim period following the election of that date, and have not had their titles regularized by
INRA in 1993 or 1994. Data are indicative only for entire table and are net of land that has been sold or
returned to ex-owners in negotiated settlements, which have occurred in recent years.
2. Source: OOT, September 1994. Area titled includes land titled to Ccs cooperatives, that is, land
farmed individually but assigned to the cooperatives.
3. This estimate is close to that of Molina (1992, p. 51), table 1, net of the 100,000 manzanas occupied
by the resistance.
4. Source: OOT, September 1994. Data almost exactly as reported by Dirección General de Política
Agraria, INRA, 1991, as tabulated in Amador et al. (1991), table 3.
5. Source: Dirección de Tenencia de la Tierra, INRA, April 1992, tabulated by Amador and Ribbink
(1992, p. 34), table 3.
6. Source: Dirección General Jurídica, INRA, September 1994. Unfortunately, the number of cooperative
titles included in these statistics had to be estimated.
7. Estimate includes 300,000 manzanas of national lands or privately claimed land, though not necessarily
privately titled and recorded in a property registry, and 100,000 manzanas of land previously assigned to
cooperatives and in dispute. Also includes 300,000 manzanas of land purchased by the present government.
8. Based on Molina (1994), tables 1 and 3.
9. Source: Molina (1994), table 3. Note that the sum of the area titled and the area of CORNAP
enterprises adds to approximately 2.75 million manzanas. The difference between that figure and the
estimate of approximately 3 million manzanas acquired by the state for the agrarian reform corresponds to
the area that is estimated to have been returned to prior owners, not taking into account the return of land
by CORNAP (due to lack of data).
  Two types of title were issued during the 1981-April 1990 period: definitive, for land to which the
government had legal and recorded titled; and provisional, for land to which the government had not
completed the transaction and did not have legal and recorded title. In both types of title, the land was
identified by naming neighbors holding land to the north, east, south, and west of the titled parcel and only
approximately estimating the area.
   Data include land originally titled to beneficiaries but may not completely reflect holdings returned
to previous owners by the Commission of Review (Comisión de Revision), created by Decree 11-90.9
t These allocations were made through a constancia de asignaci n, a certificate issued by INRA that
named the individual being granted agricultural land and an estimate of the area assigned. The bordering
properties were not identified—nor was a plan of the property prepared nor was the constancia recorded
in any book of the property registry. We assume that some of these constancias have been regularized
through the issuance of regular titles in 1993 and 1994.
tt These allocations are made through a definitive property title, which is recordable in the property
registry.
In some cases the decisions made by the commission during its year of operation have
been ignored; in other cases the claimants have attempted to implement the determinations
through use of force; and in still other cases the negotiations between previous owners and
present occupants have produced either complete or partial evictions or decisions to relinquish
the claim. In urban areas efforts at returning rights to land to their former holders have
likewise brought violent confrontations in some instances and mediations and satisfaction in
others. The perceived illegitimacy of government s allocating rights to land and the existence
of different "legal" titles to the same property are the main sources of tenure insecurity.
Several decrees issued in September 1992 attempted to clarify the procedures for
reviewing claims of previous owners, for compensating claimants if they proved they were
rightful owners of the properties, and for deciding whether the properties "can be returned."
Once the commission concludes that the claimant really was the registered property owner
at the time of appropriation by agrarian reform (or, in the case of urban properties, by some
other agency or occupant) and, moreover, that the property cannot be reinstated, it refers the
case to the Office of Quantification of Indemnifications (Oficina de Cuantificación de
Indemnificaciones, Ocl) for determining the value of compensation to be awarded, if any, the
bank debt of the owner in cases of unpaid loans, the interest due on unpaid loans, and the
overdue taxes. The properties are granted the cadastral value valid as of September 1992, not
the value at the time of expropriation (which is presumably also the value used to guarantee
mortgages). 
An important issue is whether the claimant had an unpaid loan which was guaranteed by
the property, how to value that loan and accumulated interest, and how to interpret loan
foreclosures that deprived the previous owner of the property. Apparently the government is
willing to admit all contentions of people who presented their claims under Decree 11-90 and
who can prove that they were owners of property lost through confiscation or expropriation
or simple occupation during the previous government. The government is also willing to
review claims from people who were confiscated because of being related to Somoza or
members of his political group, though there is no automatic judgment in their favor, as in
the case of other acquisitions.
1. The value at time of expropriation, if market value were used, would probably be substantially less, even
in dollar-equivalent terms, than the 1992 market value, since property owners were leaving the country and the
supply of properties on the market was large. The question of valuation will influence the overall cost of
indemnification, of course, as well as any debts that previous owners have to repay.to
The recent decrees create a compensation procedure for awarding claims of previous
owners with twenty-year bonds, at 3 percent interest, with value tied to the official rate of
exchange for the U.S. dollar and capitalized interest. These bonds are freely transferable and
can be used to purchase publicly sold shares in state property. At present, the bonds cannot
be used for paying other debts to the state such as taxes.
The reactivation of the National Review Commissions could lead to satisfying demands
for compensation presented by previous owners, who could then withdraw their pressures on
present occupants. This would facilitate legalization of the rights of present tenants. At the
same time, commission decisions to recognize the property rights of previous owners could
complicate efforts to legalize the claims of present occupants, who must await determination
of whether the properties were really owned by the claimants or whether they "cannot be
returned.
"2
1.4 DE FACTO TITLING AND TENURE INSECURITY
De facto allocations are also common in Nicaragua, with its tradition of absorbing
unemployed people by encouraging or allowing them to extend the agricultural frontier by
converting forestland to agricultural uses. These people demonstrate possession of the land
by working it, typically by clearing the forest cover.
The Agrarian Reform Law of 1981, as amended in 1986, permitted the definitive titling
of such individuals, and nearly 53,000 people (precaristas) received titles (see table 1.2,
p. 8). In the past there has been little controversy or insecurity in these allotments of rights
to land. However, with rising concern about continued deforestation of the country and with
creation of protected areas such as the BOSAWAS and SIAPAZ reserves, questions emerge about
the security of existing claims within these areas and the nature of future rights established
by migration into the territory. Also, as the agricultural frontier moves farther east and south,
there are increasing conflicts between the colonos and the indigenous groups, who claim large
portions of the Atlantic coastal region.
De facto allocations have also occurred on publicly owned land in urban areas as people
migrated to the cities during the war, occupied land, and built assorted housing units. Some
of these allocations have been given subsequent documentation while others have not. As the
municipal governments adjust to new municipal legislation, which gives them d i rect
administrative responsibility over ejidal lands assigned to them during the colonial era to
provide for future urban growth, and as the financial crunch on municipalities intensifies,
pressures will increase to sell such lands rather than simply legalize spontaneous occupations.
Political criteria used for assigning and legalizing such claims add to the complications and
tenure insecurity for many urban residents.
2. See Stanfield (1994) for a discussion of the achievements and problems of the programs launched in 1992
for resolving property conflicts.11
1.5 DISTRIBUTION OF STATE ENTERPRISE LANDS: ANOTHER SOURCE OF
TENURE CONFLICT
State-owned lands not administered by INRA are also being reassigned in a program of
privatization, which primarily affects the state's agrarian reform enterprises, commonly
known as APP (Area de Propiedad del Pueblo) or UPE (Unity de Producción Estatal).
According to CORNAP, by early 1992 the redistribution of these lands had affected AGROEXCO
(35,398 manzanas, mostly cotton land and processing facilities making up 114 properties in
León and Chinandega), HATONIC (309,427 manzanas used for livestock in 193 properties),
CAFENIC (76,624 manzanas, mostly coffee land and processing facilities in 133 properties),
and CHILTEPE (15,355 manzanas for livestock and dairy production in 154 properties).
Of the 436,804 manzanas containing 594 properties which had been part of these
enterprises, 30.6 percent of the land has been ordered returned to the "private sector," that
is, mostly to ex-owners though in some cases to third parties. The ex-owners are required to
pay for any infrastructural improvements made on the properties. Of the remaining 69.4
percent of the land, 17.3 percent was assigned to ex-soldiers, 20.2 percent to demobilized
members of the resistencia nicaragüense, and 31.9 percent to workers from AGROEXCO,
HATONIC, CAFENIC, or CHILTEPE.
The workers, in turn, organized themselves into corporate enterprises (Sociedades
Anónimas Laborales) both to establish legal standing and to create an ownership structure that
would encourage investment and improve productivity. Thesociedades, whose employees are
co-owners,' have four classes of members:
(1) ex-workers from AGROEXCO who were not employed by the new enterprise, who
received 6 shares apiece (with a nominal value of C$5 per share);
(2) 180 ex-workers of AGROEXCO who were employed by the new enterprise, who
received 10 shares apiece;
(3) selected present-time employees, who received an additional 10 shares for length of
employment and for past contributions to the enterprise; and
(4) several of 346 ex-workers, who were not employed by the new enterprise but who
received an additional 10 shares for length of service and for past contributions to the
enterprise.
CORNAP provided a certificate to these groups for the "administration and keeping of
goods" (administratión y guarda de bienes), but retained ownership for the time being. These
titles have not been recorded in the property registries. In addition, CORNAP typically has a
rental contract with the recipients of the property, with an option to purchase (escritura de
arriendo con opción de compra), through which the receiver is obliged to pay a rent to
CORNAP for the use of the land and infrastructure. These contracts were also not recorded
in the registries. The financial arrangements in some cases are still in dispute. The state will
claim ownership of the land until sales are complete, which may be substantially delayed and
cause confusion over the status of the land titles.
3. In the case of the AGROEXCO, 526 workers organized into the new Empresa Carlos Arguero.12
1.6 LAND CLAIMS OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE PACIFIC AND
CENTRAL REGIONS 
Indigenous communities in the Pacific and central regions of the country have historical
claims to extensive pieces of highly productive, valuable land. The claims of these
communities derive from colonial times, as modified in the early 1900s by actions of the
Zelaya government to privatize land, which delineated indigenous from nonindigenous lands.
The titles for these lands indicate that they are not accessible on the regular land market,
that is, they cannot be bought or sold. The communities have the right to rent their lands,
however, as exemplified in the Sebaco area, where ten-year rental contracts provide
nonindigenous people with access to community land. In Sebaco, renters pay a differential
fee depending on the quality and use of the land leased. In practice, these rental arrangements
are more often theoretical in that the rent is either nominal, not paid (as in the Matagalpa
community), or not even charged (as in the case of the Sutiava in L.e6n). Members of the
communities retain usufruct (uso y goce) to pieces of land allocated to them by their
indigenous governing bodies.
Since 1953, the alcaldias of themunicipios where indigenous communities hold land have
had the right to oversee and certify elections of the boards of directors of the communities.
Competing political interests contribute to divisions in the communities and conflicts over
which is the legitimate governing body. This uncertainty assumes greater significance as the
communities reassert their rights to land and act legally and politically to recover control over
lands which have long been in nonindigenous hands or which have greatly increased in value.
The resurgence of indigenous communities as cohesive ethnic groups with specific land
claims—along with the existence of documented titles to community land—adds another layer
of tenure rights to an already complex situation. In León , there are constant maneuvers by
the Sutiava Indians to recover lands thought to have been usurped illegally by non-Sutiava.
In Sebaco, very productive land within the titled area of the indigenous community is claimed
by private owners and by cooperatives which were assigned land by the previous government.
In some cases, as in the Empresa del Valle de Sebaco, which occupies about 400 manzanas
of highly productive land, rental agreements continue and payments are made to one of two
juntas directivas. Some of the cooperatives pay the rent, but others claim to be legitimate
owners. Some private owners can produce recorded titles that show them to be the rightful
owners.
2. TYPES AND EXTENT OF LEGAL INSECURITY OF LAND TENURE IN
NICARAGUA
Following the election in February 1990, the UNO government moved immediately to stop
the war, resettle the ex-combatants, and return the land that had been "unjustly" taken from
4. This paper does not deal with problems of indigenous people of the Atlantic region.13
its previous owners. Through the various procedures described above and due to the form of
state acquisition of land and its titling to cooperatives and individuals, in repeated instances
several people claim the same rights to the same piece of land. In most cases these claims
have a basis in law. This superimposition of rights lies at the core of the problem of legal
tenure insecurity.
The extent and seriousness of legal insecurity of land tenure, with its strong social and
psychological overtones, can be only approximately described with statistics (even if reliable
statistics were available, which is not the case in Nicaragua). Some data exist that give a
rough estimate of the extent of tenure insecurity, which is inordinately high whatever index
one chooses to use. Data do not exist to provide accurate estimates of the potential and actual
conflicts that arise from the claims of indigenous communities.
For the time being—and for purposes of estimating the situation after indigenous tenure
superimpositions—we present tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 to show different types of tenure
security calculated from existing data. These data do not consider definitive titles, which have
been recorded sporadically in some registries. The Unión Nacional de Agricultores y
Ganaderos (UNAG) reckons that 1,500 cooperatives have legally incorporated themselves and
have registered definitive agrarian reform titles. This effort reduces somewhat the seriousness
of legal tenure insecurity, though subdivision of land, subsequent sales, and continued
uncertainty about possible return of land to former owners introduce elements of doubt even
for definitive agrarian-reform cooperative titles.





1. Definitive titles, pre-1990, but recordable only following corrections of errors in titles
► Cooperatives, potential conflict with previous owners  4,855
► Individuals, potential conflict with previous owners  7,623
► Individuals, on previous national lands or lands claimed by some public agency,
potential conflict with agency or other untitled claimant 52,900
► Indigenous communities, on national lands, potential conflict with other groups 600
2. Provisional titles, pre-1990, with deficient estimates of area and boundary location
11,769 ► Cooperatives, potential conflict with previous owners 
► Individuals, potential conflict with previous owners  14,358
3. Families in possession of previously private land, with some document but not a
provisional or definitive title 14,180
4. Families in possession of previously private land, with no document 750
Total, pre-1990, agricultural land-holding households, with some title defect 107,035
a. Several UNO government decrees reestablish claims of previous owners to property that the previous
government had acquired, especially Presidential Agreement of September 1992, which ordered National
Review Commissions to decide all such claims favorably. Even confiscations effected under Decree 3 and
Decree 38 appear to be more easily reversed at present, though the situation is, as usual, ambiguous.
Source: Derived from table 1.2 (p. 8).14
TABLE 2.2 Agricultural land titled after February 1990
LAND TITLES # OF FAMILIES
1. Titles issues during transition (piñata ), with deficiencies in area and boundaries
► Individuals in possession of and prior to 02/90, on previously private property 7,963 
► Cooperatives in possession of land prior to 02/90, on previously private property 24,448 
► New assignment of land during transition, previously private property, with less
than 50 mammas per person 1,830 
► New assignments with more than 50 manzanas per person 650°
Subtotal 34,891
2. New titles, after April 1990, through July 1992
► Constancias de asignaci n, on previously state, cooperative, or private lands,
with deficient estimates of area and boundaries 24,038
Total households with title defects, post-February 1990 titling 58,929
a. Source: Mireya Molina Torres,  Legislación agraria y su vigencia actual," mimeo. (Managua,
21 September 1992); DGPA-INRA, 1992 data (see annex 1); and table 1.2 (p. 8).
b. Source: DGPA-INRA, 1992 data.
TABLE 2.3 Titling of urban land and property conflicts
I PROPERTIES TITLED # OF CONFLICTS
Properties titled through Law 85, previously publicly owned 3,850
Properties titled through Law 85, previously privately owned 21,250
Urban lots titled through Law 86, on publicly owned land 90,000
Urban lots titled through Law 86, on previously private land 10,000
Total households, urban land with title defect 125,100
TABLE 2.4 Summary of legal insecurity of tenure situation
FORM OF INSECURITY IN LANDOWNERSHIP
# OF
HOUSEHOLDS
1. Total number of households with agricultural land, assigned before May 1990, with some
title defect 107,035
2. Total number of households with agricultural land assigned by present government, with
some title defect 58,929
Subtotal of households with agricultural land with some title defect 165,964
3. Total number of households with urban land, with some title defect 125,100
Subtotal of households with title defects (agricultural and urban properties) 291,064
4. Previous owners with claims for properties 28,000 
Total number of households with actual or potential conflict over land 319,064
a. Declaration of a functionary of the OoT (Oficina de Ordenamiento Territorial) responsible for
review of titles to urban properties assigned under Laws 85 and 86 of 1990; reported in Nuevo Diario,
20 October 1992.15
3. RESOLUTION OF TENURE CONFLICTS
The superimposition of claims to the same piece of land by different people is occurring in
alarming proportions, even if the data reported in tables 2.1-2.4 are only approximations.
Roughly 40 percent of the households of the country find themselves in a conflict or a
potential conflict over land tenure. These conflicts can fester for months, years, or centuries,
but for people to make the kinds of investments that are required for the development of the
country, security of tenure must be conveyed so that benefits from risk will be realized—for
it is not likely that people will plant seeds if they fear they will not be allowed to harvest the
crop. Tenure security can be provided by encouraging people to mediate their conflicting
claims and come to some agreement about who has what rights to what land.
This mediation can be effected through the legal system, but under Nicaraguan conditions,
where nearly every claimant to land can show some sort of legal title, and where people in
possession have been fighting for the past ten years to establish or protect their claims, hope
that the legal system can reconcile conflicts seems misplaced. On the other hand, if the legal
system cannot respond, people, who live next to each another can reach agreement about how
their rights to land will be distributed. This process of mediation and redistribution of socially
defined—not necessarily legally defined—rights to land has indeed been occurring in
Nicaragua. The legal system can encourage such agreements and incorporate them into new
property records protected by law and enforced by the state in alignment with the decisions
of local communities. The following cases and experiences, though of varying size and
impact, show how this mediation is being done and offer some ideas for accomplishing the
task of improving tenure security in as short a time as possible.
3.1 LAND TITLING IN WASLALA
Waslala has been the scene of extensive violence for the past ten years. Many of the
resistance fighters have settled in the area after the government promised that if they
disbanded, they would receive 50 manzanas of land and a house—and money for the arms
they surrendered. Army veterans and supporters of the previous government's social and
military programs also live in the area, along with members of cooperatives that got land
titles from the former government, landowners who acquired title to land when it was settled
by colonists in the past century, and displaced indigenous populations. This explosive mixture
of people, who are apt to use violence to settle their disputes, has been a great preoccupation
of the present government.
To deal with this situation, the president's office asked IN1tA to provide land to the
ex-combatants and to stipulate definitive land titles which would be recorded in the Matagalpa
property registry. In 1990, without the knowledge of the existing landowners, the local
comisión agraria ordered ex-members of the resistencia nicaragüense to settle in the area.
In essence, then, lands were occupied by force.
Initially the INRA team expected that there would be national lands available for settling
the new land occupiers, but upon beginning contacts in the Waslala area, it found that there16
were few, if any, unclaimed lands that were suitable for agriculture. Although some lands that
had been acquired by the previous government and assigned to cooperatives, some of whose
members had subsequently left the area, the members who remained claimed ownership and
refused to incorporate the new allottees into their groups, albeit some lands had been forcibly
occupied by the ex-resistencia. However, the eighteen cooperative members who remained
(out of forty original members) finally ceded, agreeing to sell their land for C$376 per
manzana. (The occupying resistencia group, in fact, had already divided up the land even
before the arrival of the INRA survey team.)
INRA began negotiating with other owners in the area to purchase land, though shortage
of funds and objections of landholders have slowed the process of legal acquisition.
Ultimately agreements were made to purchase ten properties, totaling 11,900 manzanas, and
the procedure for legalization was completed. The price paid ranged from C$200 to C$400
per manzana depending on the location and quality of the land as well as on the eagerness of
the owner to sell, a factor influenced by past occupations of land and violence in the area.
After several months of negotiation, purchases were confirmed so that definitive title could
be issued in September 1992.
The process of legalization, which was expected to last for two months, has still not been
completed for some of the occupied farms. In one instance, the survey crews were kidnapped
when they arrived to lay out the parcels to be titled and INRA was forced to issue definitive
legal land rights as a condition for their release. This property is still in dispute.
The 356 definitive titles that were issued contain no written restrictions on the transfer
of property, though INRA A is required by law to approve such transfers before they can be
inscribed in the property registry. The titles append no survey plan, though each identifies
the property by naming owners on the northern, southern, eastern, and western borders
(surveying, on the other hand, is designed only to determine the area of the parcel, which is
otherwise included in the document). The parcels are not outlined with monumentation,
though claimants do create clearings so that neighbors are certain of their limits and in some
cases have installed fences to mark boundaries. The surveying of properties and subdividing
of parcels was contracted to a local survey company for C$18 per manzana (or approximately
US$3.40). Titles were issued to both men and women. If a man and woman were married
and if both parties had served in the resistencia, both received a title. Otherwise, only the
"family head," usually a man, was named as owner on the entitlement.
The experience in Waslala has exposed problems involved with searching the property
registries to determine the extent and nature of the rights of individuals who claim to be
owners of land. The Matagalpa Registry, for instance, had been burned in 1979, and much
of the original information was never recovered. In some cases, moreover, the registration
of title transfer was recorded in the Bluefields Registry, since Waslala belonged administra-
tively to Bluefields at one time. But even beyond these locational difficulties, land records
tend to be poorly maintained, making the situation of relevant information tedious: name
indices are disorganized and incomplete; information about transactions is entered into the
books by hand and is often difficult to read; pages are missing; and register books are bulky17
and hard to handle. Much of the task of finding information depends on the memories of the
staff, who in practice make an invaluable resource. Searching the registry, in sum, can be
less than confidence-inspiring.
The land market has been active in the Waslala area. Several recipients of land in the
titling project effected sales or trades even before receiving definitive title. In some cases
resistencia members who were not native to the area apparently were anxious to move closer
to their families and converted their landholdings into cash. In other cases title receivers
seemingly wished to live closer to Waslala and traded their land allocations for others, again
before being issued definitive title.
The problem of deforestation is also quite conspicuous in Waslala. The settling of several
hundred new persons has stimulated the clearing of forests, which is proceeding without
explicit authorization from the Instituto de Recursos Naturales (National Resource Institute,
IRENA), whose restrictions on cutting trees are difficult to enforce in an area with a tradition
of violence. Poverty is a motivating force to deforesting, especially since people find that
agriculture is not very profitable, with or without a definitive title. Moreover, there is
growing discontent among titled landowners about lack of credit and technical assistance, low
prices for basic grains, and high prices for inputs. The borders of the BOSAWAS reserve,
which are close to the titled lands, have been demarcated (brush and trees cleared or marked)
to indicate the areas where access to land and timber is permitted. In practice, the BOSAWAS
reserve is being severely damaged by logging, one enterprise allegedly organized by one of
the commanders of the resistencia nicaragüense (a person who was not included in the titling
program, however).
In this process of negotiating for acquisition and legalization of ownership, a municipal
commission played an important role in explaining the program of titling to the local people
and convincing local landowners to sell some or all of their land to INRA. Important parts of
the procedure were the commitment of the committee to land acquisition and the actual
composition of the commission.' This activity of explaining, negotiating, searching for
information, checking versions of property rights, and getting people to agree proved to be
very time-consuming and demanding of resources for transport and field staff—though it was
also essential to finding durable arrangements for dealing with conflicts over land. One of the
important lessons of this pilot titling program are the needs to program adequately for this
operation and find ways to avoid the expense of contracting professional staff.
3.2 LA CONCEPCION (MASAYA)
6
In the early 1980s Carlos Fonseca, a cooperative (CAS) with fifty-seven members,
received title to land that had previously been organized into seven farms. In April 1990, one
5. The municipal commission was composed of the alcalde of Waslala along with representatives of various
governmental agencies (Ministerio de Gobernación, Ministerio de Agricultura, army, and police), local
landowners, and the resistencia nicaragüense .
6. Presented in the study by Amador y Ribbink (1992).18
of these farms, which was expropriated from Isolina Alvarado under Decree 329 (that is,
taken by MIDINRA), was occupied by former members of the resistencia. A truck and two
oxen were stolen and crops were damaged during the first days of occupation; the occupiers
remained in possession of the farm.
In 1991, the Carlos Fonseca proposed that it would renounce its claim to the occupied
farm if it received due compensation for its investments. In 1992, the twenty-four people,
linked politically to the UNO coalition, who were living on the farm agreed to be responsible
for damages incurred during the violent takeover; they reimbursed the CAS with C$1,800 and
returned the truck and the oxen. The occupiers have also contracted a lawyer to arrange for
their obtaining title to the property.
Gaspar Garcia Laviana, a neighboring CAS, was occupied by a different group. The farm
was also confiscated from Sra. Alvarado, who had bought it from Eusebio Velásquez (some
members of the occupying group, as a matter of fact, were related to Sr. Velásquez). Sra.
Alvarado later petitioned to the local commissión agraria for the return of all her farms. The
commission ordered that her landownership be reinstated, but has not attempted to enforce
its ruling.
In legal terms, there were two owners of the property: the CAS, which has a title for the
confiscated land recorded in the property registry; and Sra. Alvarado, who holds a resolution
issued by the attorney general (procuradoría) that she has legal title. At present neither the
CAS nor Sra. Alvarado are in possession of the property, which is still occupied by the group
that invaded it in 1990. The CAS has not made legal entreaties to recover the property; the
occupying group has contracted a lawyer to secure legal title.
The occupying group has worked the land collectively for the past year and assumed the
debt of C$12,000 which the CAS had left with the Banco Nacional de Desarrollo. Members
of the CAS now appear resigned to losing the land. The occupiers, on the other hand, feel
more confident in their claim since both Sr. Velásquez and Sm. Alvardo say that they prefer
for the new group to retain possession.
3.3 PUNTA GORDA, NUEVA GUINEA'
The land conflict in this case began when the government assigned about 5,000 manzanas
of land—on which several privately owned farms, a cooperative, and an indigenous
community were situated—to "Galileo" and thirty-eight other ex-members of the resistencia.
The farmers, some having record of title but no formal document, protested that their lands
were being usurped after more than thirty years' possession.
One of the occupied private farms was owned by Santos Escobar, a leader of UNAG in
the region; other lands were claimed by the Suma indigenous community. The latter group
complained, "We have had these lands since colonial times. Zelaya gave us the title, and
7. From an article in Revista Productores (UNAG).19
Somoza respected us; the Sandinistas did as well. Now the fighters for liberty want to rob us
of our lands."
The conflict was quite heated, Galileo and Santos Escobar declaring themselves to be
enemies to the death. The struggle might have resulted in many deaths had not a mediation
commission
s intervened. This commission met with the contending parties and crafted an
agreement whereby each of the resistance members would receive 50 manzanas of land,
totaling 1,950 manzanas, most of which had no legitimate owner (that is, was national land).
Santos Escobar agreed to relinquish his farm in exchange for another that the commission
determined was available. UNAG s president in the region said that it was "a historic day,
when even Galileo and Santos would shake hands." The Revista Productores article does not
explain what happened to the indigenous community's land claim, what led to the discovery
of sufficient "national lands" for settling the resistance people, or what land was available for
trading with Santos Escobar. The example of mediation is important, however, and
demonstrates the role that UNAG can play in reaching local agreement about the distribution
of land.
3.4 TITLING AND REORDERING OF LAND RIGHTS IN SAN CARLOS
Resolving a triple problem—settling ex-resistance people, removing inhabitants from the
Indio-Maíz biological reserve, and stabilizing the population in the buffer zone and Vida y
Desarrollo area of the SIAPAZ reserve—is the objective of the INRA titling program in
Guásimo, San Carlos. Colonists in this SIAPAZ region profess ownership of up to 1,000
manzanas of land but have no legal title. INRA has negotiated claims in the Indio-Maíz reserve
as well as others in less sensitive areas, offering claimants definitive title to 50 manzanas of
land in the Guásimo region, roofing materials, technical assistance in the project area, better
market connections, and support for a community center, a school, and a health center in a
settlement of sixty-five houses.
INRA acquired rights to this resettlement area by "negotiating" with people in Guásimo
to give up their claims—based on long possession—to substantial portions of national land
within the SIAPAZ reserve, or land legalized as the property of INRA, in exchange for
definitive title to 50 manzanas of land in the settlement project area, building materials, and
a house plot in Guásimo.
The "territorial reordering" program successfully persuaded forty families to move out
of the Indio-Maíz biological reserve and convinced another fifteen families in the Vida y
Desarrollo zone to reduce their possessory claims to 50 manzanas of land secured by
definitive title from INRA. The program set aside a communal area for houses and buildings
to be used by veterans of the resistencia and the army and people who moved from the
Indio-Maíz reserve.
8. The mediation commission was composed of representatives of UNAG, IRENA, INRA, Procuraduría de
Justicia, FsLN, and resistencia nicaragüense ,20
INRA allocated land parcels using criteria that had been worked out in advance through
discussions with program participants (the option of assigning parcels randomly had been
rejected). Around the communal area, INRA surveyed 110 parcels of approximately 50
manzanas each, assigning the nearest parcels to older people and single women, and the more
distant parcels to younger couples.
Since surveying was done in straight lines, without regard for topographical irregularities,
parcel borders had to be marked with fences or clearings. The survey teams did place
monuments (wooden stakes) at each parcel corner, though these markers will likely disappear
with time.
For future reference for programs of this sort, the pilot effort resulted in the following
recommendations: (1) layout of parcels should locate boundaries at least 50 meters from the
high-water marks of rivers; (2) mountainous areas should not be titled with the same area and
land-use plans as level lands; (3) there should be protection zones around springs to provide
for public ownership and management; (4) private titling of steep-sided valleys and gorges
should be limited, citing either special obligations for private owners or public ownership and
administration; (5) more attention should be placed on products with a strong market demand
for diversifying agroforestry production on the titled parcels; (6) market access and credit
availability are necessary for success with settlement and titling programs; and (7) river-based
transport for both marketing products and purchasing inputs requires investment in
maintaining the navigability of the rivers—that is, clearing fallen trees and reforesting
important watersheds—accompanied by assured future control of these waterways, probably
by a public agency.
In addition to resolving conflicting tenures between the SIAPAZ program and the
landholders within the reserve, IN had to deal with contentions between the members of
twelve cooperatives that got land from the previous government and fifteen colonists (colonos)
who professed ownership of the same land but whose claims had been negated by the agrarian
reform. Most of these latter people had left the area after losing their land, but, with the
election of the new government, came back to challenge the cooperatives and demanded the
return of their property. The resulting controversy caused neither the cooperative members
nor the contending colonos to cultivate the land or care for the cattle. Members of both
groups often resorted to selling timber to finance their subsistence needs; they cut fences if
necessary and stole or slaughtered cattle.
INRA played a mediating role in this situation, negotiating separately with the cooperatives
and the colonists and crafting an agreement whereby the former kept part of their land while
the latter got some of what they claimed. The negotiation successfully reduced the areas of
conflict, but the agreement is only partially documented in that INRA has neither the
equipment nor the teams to demarcate the recognized boundaries of land—nor even the
personnel trained to issue definitive titles. The final arrangement was for the cooperatives,
which possess definitive titles, to donate part of their holdings to INRA, which will retitle the
land to beneficiaries of the settlement program, including fifteen colono families.21
INRAopted for this settlement scheme since all parties to the conflict preferred not to meet
and transfer land directly and since functionaries could negotiate better with individual
colonos about locating parcels and house plots after INRA had secured ownership.
3.5 PRODERE EXPERIENCES WITH TITLING AND CADASTRE
The Programa de Desarrollo para Desplazados Refugiados y Repatriados en Centro
América (PRODERE) operates within the overall organization of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) in Nicaragua. It has a integral regional development logic, of
which one component is legalization of rights to land claimed by people in the area covered
by the program. In the Estelí region, PRODERE staff estimate that about 60 percent of the
landholders do not have legally recorded titles.
There are two types of nonlegal tenure. Some unlawful tenure originates from transfers
that are not recorded in the property registries. Such transactions are viewed as legitimate by
the local community, however, since they stem from the customs of a people who do not even
formally record their births. Many rural communities, especially those that are isolated from
major population centers, do not register inheritances, land sales, subdivisions, exchanges,
or even claims deriving from long use and possession of national lands.
9 Such possession of
the land has been adequate under previous regimes, under which special arrangements were
made for access to credit for those who had no legal title. Under present rules, however,
banks require recorded titles as guarantees for loans of more than one year's duration (e.g.,
investment loans, which are typical in the case of cattle enterprises). It is not clear how much
of the current credit shortage is due to these changes in rules for access, which clearly favor
the larger enterprises, or is simply a consequence of a cutback in available funds.
To legalize such claims on a community-by-community basis would cost about C$500 per
title granted once the fundamental facts of each individual case become clear. To help with
this process PRODERE established diagnostic teams which work for up to two months with
local organizations and landholders to gather basic information about landholdings and land
use.
Other nonlegal tenure derives from the assignment of land to agrarian reform beneficiaries
without the state's having secured legal title before distribution. To legalize these titles, either
INRA must be vested with title or requirements for recording title must be met by using the
facilities offered in Law 88.
In either case, the cost can be high for sorting out exactly who has what rights to what
land. To deal with these often complex and overlapping claims to land, the alcalde of Estelí
has formed a municipal technical committee composed of representatives of landholders and
claimants. Working with this committee, the alcalde has arranged in several cases of conflict
9. Tenure based on length of possession can be legalized by the claimants  presenting sworn statements to
a judge, accompanied by testimonies from three witnesses that the claimants have been in possession of the land
for at least two years.22
to purchase the rights of some claimants and to transfer these to others. PRODERE S
legalization program has budgeted US$55,000 for 558 cases of contention. The properties are
all surveyed at a size-appropriate scale. Titles are issued to either individuals or collectives,
though most cooperative members are opting for individual titles—except in the Jalapa area,
where cooperatives are more economically secure. Even in cases of individual titling within
cooperatives, however, members retain the group management structure to qualify for credit
through the CODEPA program.
PRODERE is also undertaking cadastral mapping, at a scale of 1:50,000, to locate property
boundaries and facilitate planning for technical assistance and infrastructure projects. The
boundaries are located on topographic maps by teams of local residents under the overall
direction of trained land surveyors. While not sufficiently precise in most cases to meet the
requirements of a national cadastre, the methodology of involving community residents in
marking the boundaries is sound and substantially reduces costs over hiring licensed
surveyors.
3.6 UNAG EFFORTS AT LEGALIZATION OF LAND TENURES
UNAG, working in association with the Federación Nacional de Cooperativas (FENACOOP),
has supported the legalization of titles issued through agrarian reform. The effectiveness of
this program is difficult to judge, however, since the recording of agrarian reform titles in
property registries has not been consistent across districts. Nevertheless, approximately 1,500
cooperatives have registered their titles in some form. This is an important achievement,
which has been accomplished with minimal resources supplementing those put together by
UNAG and FENACOOP for offering legal services to members.
A census of cooperatives is now being conducted to assemble information on the type of
title possessed if there is no documentation, whether and how the title is recorded in the
appropriate property registry, whether the cooperative has been certified with a personería
jurídica , whether the cooperative's membership has been properly recorded with the Ministry
of Labor, and what steps are necessary for legalizing titles in cases where documentation is
lacking.
There may be deficiencies, however, even where title has been recorded in the property
registries, because there is no requirement that a design for surveying be prepared in
combination with the application for title, even in instances of subdividing fincas.  
Moreover, being "recorded" does not always mean being protected by law. In some registries
agrarian reform titles have been entered in a special "book of agrarian inscriptions," which
does not provide the same legal backing as the "real rights" books of the registries. Also, title
may have lapsed if the cooperative in whose name it was issued is no longer functioning.
Nonetheless, the experiences of UNAG and FENACOOP with legalizing titles, along with the
10. Municipalities covered by the national cadastre require a survey to be planned in conjunction with title
registration.23
availability of staff and practice with such an effort, provide still another demonstration of
local initiative and creative action in dealing with tenure insecurity.
The experiences described above give examples of how people are organizing to deal with
the problems of tenure insecurity—that is, they are not waiting for state programs, yet are
reaching agreements, often recorded in property registries, about who has what rights to land.
With these episodes in mind, we recommend the following openings as available for
immediate action while the Government of Nicaragua negotiates with the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for a comprehensive cadastre, titling, and reg-
istration program.
4. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION
The greatest immediate need is to disengage superimposed claims to land, that is, (1) to
mediate and separate conflicting claims to the same land, (2) to document the agreements
among parties in conflict, and (3) to record the documented agreements in a renovated
property registration system.
A major effort to meet this need is the cadastre, titling, and registration program,
designed with World Bank and IDB assistance, concerning land affected by the agrarian
reforms of the previous government and the distribution policies of the present government.
The target of action comprises 1 million manzanas (700,000 manzanas assigned to
ex-combatants through constancias de asignación, and 300,000 manzanas held by people with
no legal title, that is, non-resistencia occupants of agrarian reform lands).
These 1 million manzanas represent 800 properties. The proposed registration program
would legalize the state's ownership of this land, that is, complete the transfer of ownership
from previous proprietors to INRA, so that the state agency can then assign definitive titles.
The program will concentrate on geographical regions where members of the resistencia
nicaragüense have been offered or already occupy land.
The outlined method for INRA s titling involves describing the parcels in a way that
updates and extends the land cadastre, thereby equipping the titled owners with parcel plans
and the country with a precise definition of parcel boundaries. The program also proposes to
modernize the registries in which the titled properties are to be recorded, so that the
registration system will provide more accessible and secure information about rights to all
land, not just that affected by the various land-distribution policies.
There are several ways for focused programs to contribute to this overall effort of
legalization:24
(1) Assist with mediating land conflicts and record local agreements about land
rights in the appropriate property registries.
TheWorld Bank/IDB cadastre, titling, and registration program was not scheduled to start
until August 1993, and the more extreme manifestations of the problem of tenure insecurity
had to be addressed before that time. Moreover, the Bank/IDB program could proceed more
quickly if conflicts among the superimposed claims to land were resolved at least to the
satisfaction of neighbors living in the affected area. The needed conflict-resolution process
involves legalizing landholdings previously acquired by INRA but not recorded in the
registries, validating titles already issued by INRA, and updating rights that were transferred
in the interim.
This effort can be supported by INRA, UNAG, and other private organizations, which can
help the parties in conflict come to some agreement about their respective rights to land; in
addition, there may be good reason to develop the capacities of nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) to carry out this program. Whatever the institutional paradigm, it is important
that the methodology of the local land-conflict mediation commissions be tested and applied
to this process, with the legal system being the documenter of the agreements on rights to
land rather than the arbiter. Such an approach needs to be advanced and diffused in
Nicaragua, along with careful cataloging of the conditions under which it is appropriate.
Recent governmental decrees provide for the compensation of losses stemming from
agreements on rights to land where the state is a contributor to the tenure dispute. These
edicts offer an occasion to separate agreements about who has what rights to land from
questions of compensation for damage from loss of rights. This opportunity should not be
lost.
In project terms, the objective of the legalization program is the inscription of locally
substantiated rights to land in efficient property registries. Supporting activities to be carried
out in this procedure are:
(a) formation of a core team trained in techniques of conflict mediation and investigation
of land rights, including interpretation and application of relevant legislation;
(b) acquisition of basic infrastructure, office space, transportation, material, word
processing equipment, files, and administrative staff, and definition of appropriate
administrative and coordinating mechanisms linking the legalization personnel with
INRA and other governmental agencies;
(b) instruction of field mediation technicians, including staff of existing bufetes populares,
in techniques of investigating rights to land and mediating conflicts, formation of local
mediation commissions, legalization of agreements reached among holders of
conflicting rights to land, and official identification of those who acquire legalized
rights, such as personería jurídica for cooperatives;
(d) documentation of de facto and mediated agreements to separate superimposed claims
to land in priority areas of the country and transcription of these agreements;25
(e) preparation of legal descriptions of properties (in most cases survey plans) suitable
for incorporation into the national cadastre at a scale and precision appropriate to the
value of the properties;
(f) investigation of cases where the fitting methodology is legalization of property in the
name of the state and presentation of procedures appropriate for achieving that goal
to relevant state agencies;
(g) provision of legal services related to property-right transfer and registration and
delineation of responsibilities acquired by the holder of property rights as well as
other rights to land (rentals, leaseholds, inheritances, tax payments);
(h) creation of seminars and workshops involving lawyers, judges, farm-organization
leaders and members, bank employees handling mortgage processing, and other local
leaders active in the process of mediation and legalization, application of existing
legislation for recording property rights, and maintenance of accurate records of land
rights in property registries;
(i) investigation of practices under existing property-legislation procedures in Nicaragua
and neighboring countries to propose needed modifications to the National Assembly
and governmental agencies when warranted; and
(j) development of a fee scale for compensating legalization program teams for services
rendered, including greater subsidization for work relating to conflicts created by state
programs and efforts to end the war and less assistance for normal operations of the
land market.
(2) Investigate the rights to land of indigenous communities.
As the conflict-mediation and title-legalization program develops, it is important to clarify
the legitimate claims of indigenous peoples, whose rights to land have become ambiguous and
legally very fragile in this century. Actions to achieve clarification of legitimate native rights
would include:
(a) support for efforts by indigenous communities to conduct population censuses,
issuance of identity cards if desired, censuses of indigenous land held by both
nonindigenous and indigenous people, evaluation and improvement of management
systems for indigenous lands;
(b) formation and instruction of mediation commissions for the discussion of competing
claims and their possible resolution, including conduct of public meetings and
accumulation of relevant documents describing property rights over land claimed by
indigenous communities;
(c) demarcation of boundaries of indigenous lands, both where there are and are not
competing claims, after reaching consensus (performance of survey and monumenta-
tion of boundaries where competing claims have been eliminated and registration of
survey plans in proper cadastral office at no charge to agreeing parties);
(d) inscription of agreements reached, free of charge, in appropriate property registries
when competing claims have been removed; and
(e) formation of local workshops to explain procedures for transferring rights to
indigenous communities' land as well as rights and responsibilities of holders of title
to such land.26
(3) Develop mediation and titling methodologies for fragile lands and forestlands.
The rapidly expanding problems of ecological degradation require specific procedures
whereby titles issued for private access to fragile lands and forests are consistent with national
programs for the protection of such areas. For example, community-based concessions
combined with technical and financial assistance may be more effective than fee-simple
ownership of land and state ownership of forests or fee-simple ownership of both land and
forests.
At the same time, programs must be devised that provide incentives for the preservation
of forests and disincentives for their destruction. Experience in Mexico, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Brazil, and Peru can be studied for possible adaptation to Nicaraguan. It is necessary to
reduce the pressure on forests by stabilizing populations in theproductive agricultural regions
of the country (which is one objective of the legalization program).
Since various policies to protect Nicaragua's forests are in flux at this time, it is fitting
to conduct pilot programs to stabilize the populations around the SLAPAZ and BOSAWAS
reserves by such approaches as IRENA and INRA have attempted in the Guásimo area, that is,
by moving families from core zones to areas identified as capable of supporting agroforestry
programs and exchanging their large, but untitled holdings for more compact, but definitively
titled parcels.
In addition to developing and implementing these pilot programs, a separate effort should
monitor and assess the impacts of different strategies in order to identify positive methods and
ideas for possible replication on a more massive scale.
(4) Upgrade the registry system.
A key factor in Nicaragua's property problem is degradation of the registry system.
Mediation of conflicts requires more accessible registries with more accurate information.
Experience in Ecuador, for example, shows how creating a simple (computerized) database
of titles in existing registries can greatly hasten the process of adjudication of rights and
legalization of newly acquired titles. Departmental registries that correspond to government
and farmer priorities should be indexed in a way that agrees with the overall plan of registry
modernization being developed for funding by theWorld Bank and IDB. This computerization
of indices will improve access to the system by cutting down on the time needed to search
for title information and will enhance accuracy of information by identifying contradictory
entries in registry books and existing lacunae in chains of title.
Activities in registry upgrading would include:
(a) design of format and development of software and procedures for entering and
querying the property database concerning name and address of participants in
property transactions, date of transaction, date of registration, type of transaction
involved, area of property, location of property (neighborhood, community,
municipio, departamento), value involved, name of notary, name of lawyer, number27
of property, number of tomo andfolio of parent property in case of subdivision, and
fees paid to registry;
(b) contract with and training of staff for indexing and instruction of registry staff in use
of index and maintenance of database once created, care of equipment, and storage
of back-up copies of database;
(c) instruction of staff in legal procedures involved in altering incorrect or imprecise
information identified through indexing and public appeals; and
(d) purchase of required equipment, supplies, and replacement components.
(5) Strengthen the coordination of program components for legalizing title.
The Consejo Nacional del Agro (CONAGRO)" requires all regional development programs
to contain modules for resolving disputes and legalizing land titles. However, as shown in
section 3, which describes some of the local programs that work with land tenure, a variety
of methodologies of recording land rights is used by the different systems. Therefore, the
transcription process needs coordination so that resources expended will develop comparable
procedures for modernizing and improving property registration in Nicaragua and will enlist
popular support for that registry.
Since separating superimposed claims to land is a precondition to realizing investment
potentials and improving productivity—both of which are intensely needed by the Nicaraguan
economy—it is vital to coordinate the many programs being developed to resolve these tenure
problems. Yet with drastic cutbacks in public service, critically important human resources
are no longer available to effect this responsibility.
While establishing priorities within the government, the NGos, and the international donor
community is a difficult task, even under the best of conditions, the following activities are
proposed for constructing the consensus needed to assure effective use of scarce resources for
the resolution of land-tenure conflicts, urban as well as rural:
(a) development of an institutional site and capacity for coordinating, monitoring, and
evaluating programs for improving tenure security (CIERA might be an appropriate
locus for such an effort affecting agricultural land, while INIFOM might be suitable
for urban land); and
(b) organization of national and regional workshops specializing in the legal and
institutional structures and methodologies for improving tenure security in Nicaragua,
with the participation of people conversant with relevant endeavors in other countries
(the national workshop would involve the staff and leadership from central offices of
INRA, OOT, INETER, Supreme Court, INIFOM, UNAN, UCA, UNAG, legal and survey
professional associations, national confederations of indigenous peoples, CoRNAP,
movimiento comunal, ATc, and international organizations; the regional workshops
would take place in the Pacific district, the Central zone, and the Atlantic area, with
similar representation).
11. CONAGRO, which is composed of representatives of MAG, INRA, and IRENA, works as a policy
coordinating group.28
(6) Support the stabilization of land claims established through privatization of the
Areas de Propiedad del Pueblo.
Important land resources formerly organized as state enterprises (the APP) are being
distributed to new and often unprepared managers, who must deal with threats to their land
claims and, at the same time, create economically successful enterprises in a highly unstable
environment. This predicament arises especially when lands are being distributed to the
former workers of A
pps and to ex-members of the army and the resistance.
The combination of provisional assignments of land rights with undefined and untested
management structures creates a high probability of failure unless efforts are made to provide
greater security of expectations. Activities in this respect might include:
(a) extending land-assignment titles used for agrarian reform land to recipients of ex-APP
lands;
(b) combining management training with special credit programs designed to improve
market linkages during periods of transition;
(c) monitoring and evaluating worker-management models currently being implemented
and applying past experiences with group farms in Nicaragua and other countries to
the problems that these enterprises face; and
(d) developing technical packages for producing and marketing economically viable
products within an environmentally friendly framework.29
ANNEX 1
Title issued by INRA31
Mini:tro Director dal
Instituto  Nicaragüense de Reform Agraria
( )
Accionando en nombre y representacón de dicha Institucón, y de conformidad con las facultades
que le otorgan las Leyes: Decreto No. 782 del 19 de Julio de 1981, Ley de Reforma a la Ley de
Reforma Agraria No. 14 del 11 de Enero de 1986, Ley Orgánica del Instituto Nicaragüense de
Reforma Agraria (Decreto No. 38-9, publicado en el Diario Oficial "La Gaceta" No. 181 del 27 de
Septiembre de 1981) y dem s Reglamentos vigentes,
CONSIDERANDO:
I,
Que, es politica del Gobierno de la Republica de Nicaragua, impulsar un proceso de ordenamiento y
Iegalizacón de la Reforma Agraria Nicaragüense, que permits estabilidar la tenencia de la tierra,
generar las bases para el desarrollo del sector agropecuario y en particular elevar el nivel de vida de
la poblacón campesina, en cumplimiento del Programa de Gobiemo.
II,
Que, es indispensable garantizar la propiedad de la tierra a los campesinos del Sector Reformado
con el propósito de fortalecer un clima de seguridad y estabilidad en el agro nicaragüense que
beneficie a todos los productores agropecuarios.
III,
Que, igualmente es imprescindible dotar a dichos campesinos de la seguridad jurídica necesaria
sobre la tierra que trabajan, lo que permitirá que contribuyan de manera eficiente al desarrollo




Extender en forma gratuita, el presente,
TITULO DE PROPIEDAD AGRARIA,
A favor de
Representadopor
1.- Efectivamente, el INSTITUTO MCARAGUENSE DE REFORMA AGRARIA (INRA) es dueño en
dominio y posesón de la siguiente propiedad rútica; la cual se describe y deslinda de la siguiente
forma: 
Dicha propiedad se halla inscrita con los Nos.
Seccón de Derechos Reales, Libro de Propiedades del Registro Público del Departamento:
2.- De la propiedad anteriormente descrita y deslindada en la cláusula 1) que antecede, se desmembra
o segrega un Lote de terreno que wide: 
, el cual tiene los siguientes linderos particu-
lares: None, ; Sur,
; Oriente,
; Occidente,
3.- El Lote de terreno desmembrado o segregado que se ha descrito en la cláusula 2) que antecede, el
suscrito Ministro Director del INRA, se la cede y traspasa en forma gratuita a: 
representada por el Sr. (a)
quien acredita su representacón con los siguientes documentos:33
4.- Por su parte, el senor (a)
accionando en su carácter expresado, dice: que acepta la donacón.
5.- Se autoriza al señor Registrador de la Propiedad Inmueble a abrir una nueva cuenta registral para la
propiedad donada, con la correspondiente anotacón al margen de la que fue segregada.
6.- El presente Título acredita a
como el (la) legítimo (a) dueño (a) en dominio y posesón de la propiedad descrita y deslindada en
la Cláusula .
Dato en la Ciudad de , Departamento de
a los días del mes de de mil novecientos noventa y
Ministro Director Propietario
del INRA (A ruego por impedimento)
Ante mi,
Inscrito en el Libro de Titulacón del INRA con el No. Folio Tomo
Managua, de de mil novecientos noventa y35
ANNEX 2
INRA data on land titling, 1992ih37




f Area (mz) Area (mz) i Area (mz)
I 455 112,794.40 1,617 34,367.14 2,072 147,161.54
II 385 81,571.00 1,382 106,609.01 1,767 188,180.01
III 299 69,243.37 576 24,755.10 875 93,998.47
IV 476 123,298.34 648 39,016.86 1,124 162,315.20
V 92 43,100.77 894 75,485.15 986 118,585.92
VI 169 26,591.50 2,669 57,090.58 2,838 83,682.08
RAAN 5 65,612.00 384 27,913.20 389 93,525.20
RAAS 5 1,312.00 52 4,032.00 57 5,344.00
ZE III 50 22,620.50 361 30,577.58 411 53,198.08
Total 1,936 546,143.88 8,583 399,846.62 10,519 945,990.50
Source: Direccón de Política de Tierras, INRA, 1992.
ANNEX 2.2 Cooperative titling of agrarian reform lands, March-April 1990 (current
official indexes)
CAS Ccs CT CsM TOTAL
REGION N Area (mz) N Area (mz) Area (mz) Area (mz) N Area (mz)
JI 455 112,794.40 1,617 34,367.14 2,072 147,161.54 16 34,315.20 455 112,794.40
II 385 81,571.00 1,382 106,609.01 1,767 188,180.01 8 32,618.35 385 81,571.00
III 299 69,243.37 576 24,755.10 875 93,998.47 16 14,982.52 299 69,243.37
N 476 123,298.34 648 39,016.86 1,124 162,315.20 0 4,805.00 476 123.298.34
V 92 43,100.77 894 75,485.15 986 118,585.92 1 5,092.77 92 43,100.77
VI 169 26,591.50 2,669 57,090.58 2,838 83,682.08 4 5,117.50 169 26,591.50
RAAN 5 65,612.00 384 27,913.20 389 93,525.20 0 65,042.00 5 65,612.00
RAAs 5 1,312.00 52 4,032.00 57 5,344.00 0 0.00 5 1,312.00
ZE III 50 22,620.50 361 30,577.58 411 53,198.08 0 16,005.50 50 22,620.50
Total 1,936 546,143.88 8,583 399,846.62 10,519 945,990.50 45 177,978.84 1,936 546,143.88
Source: Direccón de Política de Tierras, INRA, 1992.38
ANNEX 2.3 Individual titling of agrarian reform lands, March-April 1990 (current
official indexes)
STRATUM 1 STRATUM 2 STRATUM 3 STRATUM 4 STRATUM 5 TOTAL.
REGION Area (mz) M Area (mz) x Area (mz) N Area (mz) 4 Area (mz) I Area (mz)
I 952 3,584.25 497 9,991,63 143 11,829.23 22 6,037.89 4 2,924.14 1,617 34,367.14
II 465 2,292.95 584 16,263.95 233 19,417.89 63 19,578.02 37 49,056.20 1,382 106,609.01
III 304 1,117.15 165 3,767.25 84 6,778.30 17 4,672.40 6 8,420.00 576 24,755.10
IV 372 1,177.44 163 3,585.92 81 6,698.50 16 5,226.00 16 22,329.00 648 39,016.86
V 37 175.57 273 7,770.37 504 37,649.54 69 19,482.30 11 10,407.37 894 75,485.15
VI 1,434 5,728.15 1,010 18,292.93 179 16,293.50 37 10,849.00 9 5,927.00 2,669 57,090.58
RAAN 6 52.00 214 5,344.20 142 12,735.00 17 5,032.00 5 4,750.00 384 27,913.20
RAAS 1 26.00 19 504.50 29 2,658.00 3 843.50 0 0.00 52 4,032.00
ZE III 15 71.20 213 5,955.83 113 9,159.55 13 3,620.00 7 11,771.00 361 30,577.58
Total 3,586 14,224.71 3,138 71,476.58 1,507 123,219.51 257 75,341.11 95 115,584.71 8,583 399,846.62
Stratum 1 = < 10 manzanas
Stratum 2 = 10-49 manzanas
Stratum 3 = 50-199 manzanas
Stratum 4 = 200-500 manzanas
Stratum 5 = > 500 manzanas
Source: Direccón de Política de Tierras, INRA, 1992.39
ANNEX 3
Land distribution, Area de Propiedad del Pueblo
Source: Preliminary data, CORNAP, 1992.F41
AGROEXCO
AREA PROPERTY
BENEFICIARIES (mz) % # %
Returns to private sector 17,221.4 48.7 62 54.4
Former army members 4,481.8 12.7 16 14.0
Workers 11,396.1 32.2 27 23.7
Demobilized resistance 2,299.0 6.5 9 7.9
Total area 35,398.3 100.0 114 100.0
Production statistics
AGRICULTURAL VOLUME % NATIONAL
PRODUCTION (000 QQ) PRODUCTION








Returns to private sector 80,455.0 26.0 78 40.4
Former army members 59,034.0 19.1 27 14.0
Workers 99,319.0 32.1 56 29.0
Demobilized resistance 70.619.0 22.8 32 16.6
Total area 309,427.0 100.0 193 100.0
Production statistics
CATTLE VOLUME % NATIONAL
PRODUCTION (head) PRODUCTION
Cattle for slaughter 22,500 15.7
Breeding stock 5,000 70.0




(mz) (56) (#) (%)
Returns to private sector 26,890.0 35.1 54 40.6
Former army members 10,250.0 13.4 19 14.3
Workers 24,942.0 32.6 38 28.6
Demobilized resistance 14,542.0 19.0 22 16.5




MILK VOLUME % NATIONAL
PRODUCTION (000 QQ) PRODUCTION
Milk
No. of workers 200
Café 88.2 14.7
Processed coffee 150.0 25.0






Returns to private sector 9,312.0 60.6 133 86.4
Former army members 1,700.0 11.1 3 1.9
Workers 3,661.0 23.8 7 4.5
Demobilized resistance 682.0 4.4 11 7.1
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